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Abstract
Technological change has transformed creative media industries.
Digitization lowers the costs of recording, storage, reproduction and
distribution, while computer-based editing facilitates quality enhance-
ment and special e¤ects. Digital technology has altered the distrib-
ution of sales in ways that remain poorly understood: while some
commentators have highlighted the growth of the long tail, others
nd digitization has raised the importance of superstars. This paper
develops a theoretical model of di¤erentiated goods with endogenous
quality to investigate the impact of digitization on the distribution of
rms. It nds that supply-side factors can generate superstars and
long tail outcomes, and that coexistence of both phenomena can be
explained by either a fall in xed costs for basic products or a decline
in market size.
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1 Introduction
Digitization has transformed creative media industries, with a range of im-
pacts on the cost structure of production and supply. In the production of
recorded music and video content, digitization has lowered the costs of record-
ing, storage and reproduction. Computer-based editing has made higher
quality production possible at lower cost and facilitated new special e¤ects
superior to those previously available. Distribution on physical media has
shifted to cheaper, more compact, higher quality formats from vinyl and
tape to CD for music; from VHS to DVD and Blu-ray for video while elec-
tronic distribution over cable and the internet has greatly reduced distrib-
ution costs by eliminating the transportation of physical media altogether.
Digitization of television signals has permitted many more channels to be
shown for a given capacity of radio spectrum or cable infrastructure, and
allowed images to be broadcast in higher denition. Online stores have en-
tered retail markets: with lower xed costs than traditional outlets these are
able stock a far larger number of products, making a potentially vast range
of varieties available to consumers.
Technological developments have also a¤ected the demand side of creative
media industries. New formats and modes of distribution, such as e-books,
movie downloads, and mobile television, have expanded demand in some ar-
eas by o¤ering consumers new ways of enjoying media products. Internet
and electronic distribution have enabled retailers to serve harder-to-reach
customers who struggle to access high street stores, and to supply national
and global markets rather than just the local area. However, recent develop-
ments have not always been benecial for producers: in the music industry,
where the ease of copying and storing digital music has facilitated widespread
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le-sharing and piracy, commercial sales have fallen dramatically.
Digital technology has altered the distribution of sales in creative media
industries in ways that remain poorly understood. Some commentators have
highlighted a shift towards niche products and the growth of the long tail.
Anderson (2004, 2006) reports that online music distributors stock many
more albums than a typical high street outlet, with even relatively unpopular
tracks achieving a handful of downloads each month, and also notes the
decline in sales levels for the top music albums in the early 2000s. Other
authors report a more mixed picture, nding in addition to the long tail the
presence of superstar e¤ects as conceived by Rosen (1981), which found
that the shift from live to recorded music increased returns to top artists. In a
study of (legal) online music downloads, Page and Garland (2009) nd a hit-
heavy, skinny-taildistribution, with more than three-quarters of the total
inventory of tracks remaining unsold. Similarly, Elberse and Oberholzer-Gee
(2007) nd that in the US home video market (DVD and VHS), sellers o¤er
more products but many of these achieve few sales, while amongst best-sellers
there is greater concentration on a small number of titles.
This paper investigates theoretically the impact of digitization on the
distribution of rms in creative media industries. The goal is to character-
ize the distribution of products supplied under free entry conditions where
products are di¤erentiated both horizontally and vertically. To do this I de-
velop a model that captures key features of creative media industries, and
use this to study the e¤ects of technological changes that lower distribution
costs, xed costs, and the cost of enhancing product quality. Specically,
I adapt the pyramid spatial model developed by Von Ungern-Sternberg
(1991) and simplied by Brito (2003), in which competition is symmetric be-
tween products, in contrast to the near neighborform of the more familiar
Salop (1979) framework. The equilibrium number and mix of heterogeneous
products is then determined by a free entry condition.
Market structure is characterized in the following way. Superstar out-
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comes occur when there is greater investment in the quality of top-selling or
premiumproducts (e.g. higher expenditure on blockbuster movies), and/or
these products achieve higher individual sales, either in absolute terms or as
a share of the market. In other words, superstar phenomena are associated
with bigger hits. The long tail refers to an increase in the number of niche
or basic products that are sold; for this to be more than an empty tail,
basic products must also account for an increased share of total sales.
The main insight of the paper is that both superstar and long tail out-
comes can be explained by supply-side factors. Moreover, in some situations
the two phenomena can coexist, consistent with the empirical ndings de-
scribed above. Results show that a reduction in xed costs for basic products
generates both a long tail, increasing the number and share of niche prod-
ucts sold, and superstar e¤ects, raising the quality of premium products and
the sales of each one. A decline in market size also generates both types of
e¤ects. By contrast a reduction in the cost of enhancing quality is one-sided,
raising investment in premium products a superstar e¤ect but not a long
tail.
This research contributes to a small but growing literature on long tail
e¤ects. Brynjolfsson, Hu and Simester (2011) focus on consumer search,
examining how a reduction in search costs a¤ects concentration in product
sales. In a theoretical model of consumer search behavior lower search costs
result in a less concentrated sales distribution, a result which they observe
empirically in sales data from a multi-channel retailing company. Fleder and
Hosanagar (2009) use analytical modeling and simulation to examine the
e¤ect of recommender systems on sales diversity. They nd that while these
systems may increase individual-level diversity, they tend to push consumers
towards the same products, decreasing aggregate diversity. Tucker and Zhang
(2011) assess the e¤ect of popularity information on consumer choice, under
the hypothesis that the same level of popularity implies higher quality for
narrow-appeal products (niches) than for broad-appeal products that would
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be expected to attract a large number of customers. Using data from a
website listing wedding service vendors, the authors nd that niche vendors
receive more clicks than equally popular broad-appeal vendors, softening the
concentration bias of popularity-based recommendations.
In focusing on search costs and recommender systems, this literature em-
phasizes demand-side technological drivers of long tail e¤ects. By contrast,
this paper emphasizes supply-side factors, in particular the role of technology
in altering exogenous and endogenous xed costs.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops a model of di¤er-
entiated products with endogenous quality and free entry, initially with iden-
tical cost functions. This is extended to heterogeneous products in section 3:
here rms choose between the production of basic and premium goods, which
have di¤erent production technologies. Using this framework, the impact of
developments linked to digitization on industry structure and outcomes are
examined. Section 4 concludes. An appendix contains longer proofs.
2 A model of horizontal di¤erentiation with
endogenous quality
2.1 Modeling approach
In modeling the impact of digitization in creative media industries, I wish to
capture the following features and developments:
1. Horizontal di¤erentiation: media content is a highly diverse product
class; consumers are heterogeneous in their individual preferences and
most desire some variety of products. The impact of digitization on
the number of product types supplied is central to the analysis.
2. Fixed costs: content production costs are almost entirely xed, with
a large rst copy cost. Retailing also incurs some xed costs, e.g.
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buildings and display space. Digitization lowers xed production costs
with cheaper video hardware, storage and editing, while internet re-
tailing greatly reduces the xed costs of stocking a range of products
compared with traditional stores.
3. Quality and endogenous xed costs: while being xed in relation to the
number of consumers, production costs typically increase with higher
quality, thus xed costs are at least partially endogenous. Digitization
lowers the cost of quality enhancement, due to e.g. digital processing,
high denition, computer-based editing and movie special e¤ects.
4. Distribution costs: retail distribution incurs some per-unit cost, e.g.
pressing and delivering a CD or DVD, though this is small compared
with the xed cost of content production. Digitization lowers distrib-
ution costs, especially with the replacement of physical media delivery
by electronic downloads.
5. Market size: digitization can expand markets, e.g. through geographic
integration, or shrink them, e.g. due to piracy.
To handle product heterogeneity in a framework that allows analytical
solution of a free entry equilibrium, I adapt a generalization of the Hotelling
(1929) model that allows for symmetric competition between an arbitrary
number of rms. The starting-point is the pyramid model developed by Von
Ungern-Sternberg (1991), in which producers are located at the corners of
a multidimensional pyramid and consumers uniformly distributed along the
edges. The model assumes a xed number of potential locations (i.e. the
dimensionality of the pyramid is given), and the number of brands actually
produced is a subset of this. Competition is symmetric, but demand curves
are kinked because of the missing brands. Brito (2003) simplies the pyra-
mid model by assuming that the dimensionality of the pyramid matches the
number of rms with no unused slots. The Brito version has the feature that
the distribution of consumers is not invariant to the entry of rms.
6
Section 2.2 presents the basic model. Its parameters capture the following
developments brought about by digitization: lower per-consumer distribution
costs, a lower cost of quality enhancement, and changes in market size. The
model of section 3 extends this framework by allowing rms to choose between
products of di¤erent qualities involving di¤erent production technologies.
The later model is used to examine the strategic choices of rms and, with
free entry, the mix and market shares of heterogeneous products in industry
equilibrium.
2.2 The model
Each of N  2 single-product rms is connected to every other by a Hotelling
line, the length of which equals the mass of consumers between the pair.1
The total length of the 1
2
N (N   1) lines equals the total mass of consumers
M > 0; it would be natural to normalize M = 1 but the parameterization
allows for the possibility of variation around this. Demand is uniformly
distributed, thus the length of the line between each pair of rms is m =
2M
N(N 1) . Consumers incur a linear per-unit transport cost t > 0, and purchase
from the rm that o¤ers them the highest utility net of transport costs. For
a given pair of rms i; j o¤ering utilities ui; uj respectively, the indi¤erent
consumer is located at xij such that ui   txij = uj   t

2M
N(N 1)   xij

; is
1In other words, the density of consumers is constant. If the lines were instead taken to
be xed in length, entry would decrease the density of consumers and so would not reduce
average transport costs (unlike in Salop). In this case a single rm would be socially
optimal as entry merely duplicates xed costs.
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demand on this sub-market is therefore given by2
xij =
1
2t

ui   uj + 2M
N
t
N   1

:
Summing across the (N 1) sub-markets, total demand facing rm i is given
by xi =
P
j 6=i
xij, which yields3
xi =
M
N
+
(N   1)
2t
(ui   u i) ; (1)
where u i = 1N 1
P
j 6=i
uj. Note that market shares are equal if rms o¤er
identical utilities, and the expression reduces to the standard Hotelling spec-
ication when N = 2.
Utility ui from consuming product i depends on product quality qi =
v0 + vi and price pi as follows
ui = v0 + vi   pi: (2)
The quality of a basic product v0 is assumed to be su¢ ciently high that all
consumers gain positive utility from purchasing, thus the market is covered.
A rm can choose its (variable) quality vi by incurring a xed cost 12v
2
i .
There is a marginal distribution cost c of supplying each consumer.
Timing in the game is as follows. Firms rst choose whether or not
2In principle a rm could also compete for consumers on lines to which it is not directly
connected by o¤ering a product that is more attractive than that of the intermediate rm,
o¤setting its locational advantage (just as in Salop a rm could win consumers located
beyond the neighboring rm). The rival would then make no sales, thus in equilibrium
would not enter. It is therefore assumed that this situation does not arise, and each
sub-market is divided between the two rms located at either end.
3This formulation would be identical to Brito (2003) but for that papers assumption of
a quadratic transport cost, which results in a di¤erent demand expression. Britos model
does not give a closed-form solution for the equilibrium number of rms under free entry,
so is not suitable for use in this paper.
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to enter the market; active rms and consumers locate as described above.4
Firms then compete for consumers, simultaneously setting quality v and price
p.
Firm is prot is given by
i =

M
N
+
(N   1)
2t
(ui   u i)

(pi   c)  1
2
v2i :
Its best responses in price and quality are
pi =
tM
N (N   1) +
1
2
 
vi + p i   v i + c

;
vi =
1
2t
(N   1) (pi   c) ;
where p i and v i are dened analogously to u i above. With N rms,
equilibrium price and quality are
pN =
2tM
N (N   1) + c and vN =
M
N
;
giving per-rm prot of
i =
M2
N2

2t
(N   1)  
1
2

:
With free entry, i(N) = 0 and the equilibrium number of rms is
N = 4t + 1; (3)
4The model structure implies that consumer locations are endogenous to the number
of rms that enter (as in Brito, 2003). Such an assumption may be justied by the
nding among marketers that consumers have di¢ culty forming preferences over unknown
products (or sets of characteristics), and instead form preferences over the available set of
products.
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and equilibrium price and quality are
p =
M
2 (4t + 1)
+ c and v =
M
 (4t + 1)
: (4)
It can be seen from these results that the distribution cost c passes through
in full to consumer prices, and has no e¤ect on either the number of rms or
quality investment.
2.3 Social optimum
For comparison the socially optimal quality per rm and number of rms are
derived. With N rms each providing a product of quality v0 + v, total con-
sumer utility from consumption is (v0 + v)M , transport costs are tM
2
2N(N 1) ,
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and production costs N
 
1
2
v2

, giving welfare of
W = (v0 + v)M   tM
2
2N (N   1)  N

1
2
v2

: (5)
Given N , the optimal quality choice is M
N
, the same as in the market equi-
librium. The welfare-maximizing number of rms is6
NW = 1 + t +
p
t (1 + t): (6)
The market generates more (fewer) rms than is socially optimal for t > (<
)1=8. Note that competitive equilibrium (N  2) requires t  1=4, which
entails excess entry (this result is common in locational models of product
di¤erentiation, as shown by Bhaskar and To, 2004). As  !1 (in the limit,
quality is xed) the ratio N

=NW rises towards 2, the same as that found in
5With N rms, each is a distance 2MN(N 1) from its rivals, thus a consumer is on average
M
2N(N 1) from her nearest product. The average transport cost is then
tM
2N(N 1) . With
mass of consumers M , total transport costs are therefore tM
2
2N(N 1) .
6Taking the positive root, as required by the second order condition for a maximum.
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the Salop model. Thus with endogenous quality the excess entry property is
partially mitigated, though not eliminated.
2.4 Impact of digitization
In this model three parameters capture the e¤ects of digitization: a lower
distribution cost, c; a lower cost of quality enhancement, ; and changes
in market size, M . The following proposition presents the impacts of these
changes on industry outcomes (proofs are straightforward and are omitted).
Proposition 1 In the endogenous quality model, the e¤ects of changes brought
about by digitization are as follows.
(i) A lower distribution cost reduces prices, but has no e¤ect on quality or
the equilibrium number of rms (@p=@c > 0; @v=@c = @N=@c = 0).
(ii) A lower quality cost raises both quality and price, and reduces the equi-
librium number of rms (@v=@ < 0; @p=@ < 0; @N=@ > 0).
(iii) Market expansion raises both quality and price, but has no e¤ect on the
equilibrium number of rms (@v=@M > 0; @p=@M > 0; @N=@M = 0).
These results suggest that the role of digitization in lowering distribution
costs has no e¤ect on industry structure or quality investment, but feeds
through to lower consumer prices. This trend has indeed been observed
throughout the late 20th and early 21st centuries, as successive new formats
make creative content available at lower prices.
By reducing the cost of quality enhancement, however, digitization has
more wide-ranging e¤ects, raising equilibrium quality and price while reduc-
ing the number of rms. This is an endogenous xed cost e¤ect: as quality
becomes cheaper to provide, rms invest more in raising quality and their
xed costs increase. With larger endogenous xed costs, this reduces the
equilibrium number of rms. In addition, prices increase to recoup the higher
xed costs.
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Market expansion raises the marginal return to quality, with similar ef-
fects to a lower quality cost: rms invest more, raising equilibrium quality
and price. As in Sutton (1991), the increase in endogenous xed costs inhibits
entry which would otherwise be expected in response to market growth, if
xed costs were purely exogenous in this case leaving the equilibrium num-
ber of rms unchanged.
Both a lower cost of quality enhancement and market expansion gener-
ate a superstar e¤ect, in that rms raise product quality. By reducing the
equilibrium number of rms, a lower quality cost also allows each to capture
a larger share of the market, another superstar outcome.
3 Competition with heterogeneous products
The central question of this paper is how digitization a¤ects the produc-
tion of di¤erent types of products. Firms may invest in better production
infrastructure to increase the quality of their output, and if rms make dif-
ferent choices a dispersion of product qualities will exist. Producers adopting
alternative production strategies may be di¤erently a¤ected by technologi-
cal changes that a¤ect the cost of quality enhancement and other factors.
By allowing for product heterogeneity the impact of digitization on di¤erent
producers and its implications for product mix can be examined.
Suppose now that there are two types of product, basicand premium,
that involve di¤erent production technologies. Basic products incur a rela-
tively low, exogenous xed cost, while premium production requires both
a higher xed cost and further investment in raising product quality. An
example might be a movie producers choice between low budget video and
expensive studio production, where the latter allows scope for greater quality
enhancement. Firms are identical ex ante but may choose di¤erent produc-
tion technologies, resulting in ex post heterogeneity.
12
3.1 The model
Upon entering the market a rm chooses between production of a basic (B)
or premium (R) product. To produce a basic product a rm pays a xed cost
F > 0, supplying a product of minimum quality v0,7 and cannot raise quality
further.8 A premium product has endogenous quality, where a product of
quality qi = v0 + vi incurs a total (exogenous + endogenous) xed cost of
K+ 1
2
(vi)
2 whereK 2 (F; 2F ). It seems a reasonable assumption that higher
quality production requires somewhat larger exogenous xed costs, and if
K = F no basic products would be produced in equilibrium. For simplicity,
the marginal distribution cost c is normalized to zero; as demonstrated in
section 2.4 a per-unit cost simply adds to prices and a¤ects no other variables.
The game takes place as follows. First, rms make entry decisions, choos-
ing simultaneously whether to enter the market and which type of product
to produce. Then in the second stage rms compete by choosing their prices
(pB and pR, for basic and premium products respectively) and, for premium
products, their quality v.
Firm i, of type g 2 fB;Rg, anticipates that a proportion  of its rivals
will be of type R and (1  ) of type B, with the total number of active rms
being N  2. Following the approach set out in section 2.2 above, it faces
demand given by
xgi =
M
N
+
(N   1)
2t
 
ugi   uR i   (1  )uB i

;
where uBi = v0   pBi and uRi = v0 + vi   pRi . Prot functions for basic and
7As in section 2.2, basic quality v0 is assumed su¢ ciently high to ensure full consumer
participation.
8A related model with two product types involving di¤erent quality costs, in which rms
discover their product type after entry, nds that the higher-cost type makes no quality
investment at all (for details see the earlier working paper available from the author).
Hence the assumption that the quality of basic products cannot be raised is not unduly
restrictive.
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premium production are respectively
Bi = X
B
i p
B
i   F ;
Ri = X
R
i p
R
i  K  
1
2
v2i :
The prot function for each product is concave in its price and, for a premium
product, in quality, thus second order conditions for a maximum are satised.
Best responses in price and quality are
pBi =
tM
N (N   1) +
1
2
 
(1  ) pB i + 
 
pR i   v i

;
pRi =
tM
N (N   1) +
1
2
 
(1  ) pB i + 
 
pR i   v i

+ vi

;
vi =
pRi
2t
(N   1) :
Given N and , second stage equilibrium prices and quality are
pBe =
1
(N   1)2t (4t   (N   1))H;
pRe =
1
(N   1)8t
2H > pBe ;
ve = 4tH;
where H = M
N(4t (N 1)(1 )) . Per-rm prots for the two products are then
B =
1
(N   1)2t (4t   (N   1))
2H2   F ;
R =
1
(N   1)8t
2 (4t   (N   1))H2  K:
At the entry stage, zero prot conditions (B = 0 and R = 0) determine
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N and , yielding the following equilibrium outcomes
N = 4t

K   F
K

+ 1; (7)
 =
F
(K   F )

MKG
4t (K   F ) +K   1

(8)
v = 2 (K   F )G; (9)
pB = FG; (10)
pR = KG > pB; (11)
where G =
q
K
2F (K F ) > 0. These solutions imply that H =
(K F )G
2t
> 0.
It can be seen that as F ! 0 ,  ! 0 and premium products are crowded
out. As K ! 0,  ! 1 and basic products are crowded out. To ensure a
solution such that  2 [0; 1] the following parameter restriction is required
4t (K   F ) +K
MG
2 [F;K] : (12)
From the above results, demands facing a single rm producing each
product type are given by
xB =
1
G
; (13)
xR =
K
GF
> xB: (14)
Expressions can readily be derived for the number of rms producing each
product type, NB = (1  )N and NR = N for basic and premium
products respectively, total demands Xg = N gxg, individual market shares
sg = xg=M , and total market shares Sg = Xg=M , where g 2 fB;Rg.
Deriving welfare results for the model with heterogeneous products is
challenging. Transport costs are complicated by the fact that Hotelling lines
are split asymmetrically when the competing products are of di¤erent types,
and welfare is a¤ected by the proportions of basic and premium products as
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well as the number of rms. Closed form solutions for the optimal number
and mix of products cannot be obtained, and it is highly unlikely that the
equilibrium and socially optimal outcomes will coincide.
3.2 Impact of digitization
With heterogeneous rms the following parameters capture the e¤ects of
digitization: a lower xed cost for basic products, F ; a lower xed cost for
premium products, K; a lower cost of quality enhancement for premium
products, ; and changes to market size, M . The following proposition
presents the impacts of these changes on industry outcomes; the results are
summarized in Table 1.
Proposition 2 In the model with heterogeneous products, the e¤ects of changes
brought about by digitization are as follows.
(1) A lower basic xed cost F raises the equilibrium number of rms, reduces
the proportion of premium products, raises the quality of premium products,
and reduces the prices of both basic and premium products. Demand for an
individual product of either type increases, while the total market share of
basic products goes up.
(2) A lower premium xed cost K reduces the equilibrium number of rms,
increases the proportion of premium products, reduces the quality of premium
products, increases the price of basic products, and may either increase or de-
crease the price of premium products. Demand for an individual product of
either type falls, while the total market share of basic products goes down.
(3) A lower cost of quality enhancement for premium products decreases the
equilibrium number of rms, but increases the proportion of premium prod-
ucts, the quality of premium products, and the prices of both basic and pre-
mium products. Demand for an individual product of either type falls, as
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Table 1: Comparative statics in the model with heterogeneous products
N* l* v* pB* pR* xB, xR sB, sR SB
F - + - + + - - -
K + - + - - then + + + +
g + - - - - + + +
M none + none none none none - -
does the total market share of basic products.
(4) Market expansion has no e¤ect on the equilibrium number of rms but
increases the proportion of premium products. It has no e¤ect on prices or
quality, leaving individual product demands unchanged, but reduces individ-
ual shares of the now-larger market. The total market share of basic products
goes down.
Proof. The proposition follows from the comparative statics results
(derivations are given in the appendix).
(1) @N=@F < 0; @=@F > 0; @v=@F < 0; @pB=@F > 0; @pR=@F >
0; @xB=@F < 0; @xR=@F < 0; @SB=@F < 0.
(2) @N=@K > 0; @=@K < 0; @v=@K > 0; @pB=@K < 0; @pR=@K < (>)
0 for K < (>) 3F=2; @xB=@K > 0; @xR=@K > 0; @SB=@K > 0.
(3) @N=@ > 0; @=@ < 0; @v=@ < 0; @pB=@ < 0; @pR=@ < 0; @xB=@ >
0; @xR=@ > 0; @SB=@ > 0.
(4) @=@M > 0; @N=@M = @v=@M = @pB=@M = @pR=@M = @xB=@M =
@xR=@M = 0; @sB=@M < 0; @sR=@M < 0; @SB=@M < 0.
3.3 Discussion
This model allows the implications of the following developments related
to digitization to be examined: lower exogenous xed costs for basic and
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premium products respectively, cheaper provision of quality, and changes in
market size. The e¤ects of a change in one parameter are often complex, with
interactions between the variables: e.g. a change in exogenous xed costs may
alter quality investment (with no change in the cost of quality enhancement),
a¤ecting endogenous xed costs and other industry outcomes.
3.3.1 Fixed costs
Recall that in Salop (1979) a reduction in exogenous xed costs raises the
equilibrium number of rms, increasing the range of varieties on o¤er. In this
model, however, the incidence of xed cost reductions for basic and premium
products makes a crucial di¤erence to this result. If digitization reduces the
basic xed cost F (e.g. by lowering the cost of video recording) then the
entry of basic products is encouraged. This increases both the equilibrium
number of rms raising variety, as in Salop and the proportion of basic
products (1 ). These are long tail e¤ects. Moreover, in this case the long
tail of basic products is not an empty one, with basic products accounting
for a larger share of the total market (higher SB).
By contrast, if it is the premium xed cost K that is reduced (e.g. lower
costs of high-end studio production) then the opposite result is found: the
equilibrium number of rms falls, reducing variety. This somewhat surprising
result can be explained as follows. All else being equal, a reduction in xed
costs for premium products stimulates their entry, increasing the proportion
of premium products. But this leaves less room for basic products, inhibiting
their entry. Since, from (14), the demand for an individual premium product
exceeds that of a basic product, entry of an additional premium product
squeezes out more than one basic product, reducing the total number of
rms.
This is not the end of the story, however: changes in exogenous xed costs
also a¤ect quality investment and endogenous xed costs (with no change in
the cost of quality enhancement). By stimulating entry of premium goods,
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a reduction in K induces each of the now-increased number of premium
producers to invest less. This lowers their quality v, decreasing the degree of
vertical di¤erentiation between premium and basic products. It also lowers
the demand facing an individual premium producer xR, though the total
market share of premium products (1 SB) still rises. The opposite changes
occur following a reduction in F : by encouraging entry of basic products,
this inhibits entry of premium goods but increases investment in each one,
raising their quality and widening the degree of vertical di¤erentiation.
The ndings for xed cost reductions for basic products suggest that
long tail and superstar phenomena can coexist. Lower F raises the total
number of products o¤ered in the market, the proportion of these that are
basic products, and the total market share of basic products these are long
tail outcomes. At the same time, the quality of premium products rises, as
do their individual market shares both superstar e¤ects. Thus, a possible
explanation for the observation of both long tail and superstar phenomena,
as reported by Elberse and Oberholzer-Gee (2007) and Page and Garland
(2009), is a reduction in the xed costs of supplying basic products.
3.3.2 Cost of quality enhancement
As in Sutton (1991), endogenous xed costs play an important role in deter-
mining market structure. A reduction in the cost of enhancing quality stim-
ulates investment in premium products, increasing vertical di¤erentiation.
Endogenous xed costs go up, reducing entry; hence the market provides
less variety. The improved quality of premium products squeezes basic prod-
ucts, whose quality cannot be raised: these account for a smaller proportion
of the now-reduced total number of products. With a higher proportion of
premium products and greater investment in each, the total market share of
premium products increases.
Thus, a lower cost of quality generates a superstar e¤ect, in that there
is more investment in the leading products and these provide higher qual-
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ity. Cheaper quality enhancement might explain the pattern observed in the
movie industry in the latter half of the 20th century, when studios spent
increasing amounts on production and blockbusters dominated the movie
scene.
3.3.3 Market size
Changes in market size have a more limited range of e¤ects. These have no
impact on the equilibrium number of rms (as found in section 2.4), and do
not change rmsquality and pricing strategies (contrary to the ndings in
section 2.4). Individual demands are unchanged, but since the size of the
market is altered this entails that each product constitutes a smaller (for a
growing market) or larger (for a shrinking market) share of the market. With
endogenous product mix, the balance between premium and basic products is
a¤ected: market expansion increases the proportion and total market share of
premium products, while a shrinking market similarly promotes basic prod-
ucts.
A declining market generates both long tail and superstar e¤ects. Al-
though there is no increase in the total number of products, a higher pro-
portion of these are basic types (which individually achieve lower sales than
premium products), and together these take a larger share of the market
long tail outcomes. This might explain the changing distribution of music
sales: while total sales have declined dramatically, the overall share accounted
for by niche products has (by some accounts) markedly increased. Meanwhile
in a shrinking market the sales levels of individual products hold up, implying
that individual market shares rise. This could explain the nding of Elberse
and Oberholzer-Gee (2007) for US home video sales a market experiencing
declining sales that the top ten percent of sales is accounted for by a smaller
number of top sellers a superstar e¤ect.
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4 Concluding comments
This paper has developed a modeling framework capturing the key features of
creative media industries and used this to examine the impact of technological
changes linked to digitization on market structure, product variety, quality
investment, and product mix. It nds that a superstar e¤ect in the sense of
greater investment in the quality of top-selling products results from either
lower quality costs for premium products or lower xed costs for basic ones.
A lower basic xed cost also raises individual sales for these products (bigger
hits) another superstar e¤ect. A decline in market size is found not to
reduce sales levels for individual products, implying that the share of the
now-smaller market held by given number of top sellers (say, the top ten)
becomes larger, as seen in some of the empirical literature also a superstar
e¤ect.
Long tail outcomes, in the sense of an increase in the number of basic
products that are sold, are found to result from either a reduction in basic
xed costs or a smaller market. The former change increases the total number
of products, increasing variety, while the latter leaves the total number of
products unchanged but increases the proportion of basic goods. In both
cases the long tail is not merely an empty one: the total market share of
basic products also rises.
The ndings in this paper demonstrate that the coexistence of superstar
and long tail phenomena as found in a number of empirical studies is
possible, indeed likely. Either a reduction in basic xed costs or a decline
in market size can explain the observation of both types of outcome. A
reduction in the cost of enhancing quality on the other hand is one-sided,
generating superstar but not long tail e¤ects.
The multitude and complexity of technological developments in creative
media industries make predictions for the future highly uncertain. As these
analyses show, future trends will be sensitive to the precise nature of changes
brought about by new technologies. However, if the incidence of cost changes
21
resulting from a particular technology can be assessed, the modeling in this
paper can then provide guidance as to its likely impact on market structure
and the distribution of product sales.
Appendix: Proof of Proposition 2
(i) Number of rms, N = 4t (K F )
K
+ 1:
dN
dF
=  4t
K
< 0.
dN
dK
= 4t F
K2
> 0.
dN
d
= 4t (K F )
K
> 0.
dN
dM
= 0.
(ii) Proportion of premium products,  = F
(K F )

MK
(4t(K F )+K)
q
K
2(K F )F   1

:
d
dF
= K
(K F )2
MG
(4t(K F )+K)

4t(K2 F 2)+K2
(4t(K F )+K) +
(2F K)
2

  K
(K F )2 where G =q
K
2F (K F ) . From (12) this has a lower bound where
MG
(4t(K F )+K) =
1
K
.
Thus d

dF
 4t(4F K)(K F )+K(2F K)
2(K F )2(4t(K F )+K) > 0 (given K < 2F ).
d
dK
=   F
(K F )2
MG
(4t(K F )+K)

4t(K2 F 2)+K2
4t(K F )+K +
F
2

+ F
(K F )2 whereG =
q
K
2F (K F ) .
From (12) this has an upper bound where MG
(4t(K F )+K) =
1
K
. Thus d

dK

  F 2(12t(K F )+K)
2K(K F )2(4t(K F )+K) < 0.
d
d
=   MK
(4t(K F )+K)
q
K
2F (K F )

4tF
(4t(K F )+K) +
F
2(K F )

< 0.
d
dM
= F
(K F )
K
(4t(K F )+K)
q
K
2(K F )F > 0.
(iii) Quality of premium product, v =
q
2K(K F )
F
:
dv
dF
=   K2
2F 2
q
2F
K(K F ) < 0.
dv
dK
= (2K F )
2F
q
2F
K(K F ) > 0.
dv
d
=  K(K F )
22F
q
2F
K(K F ) < 0.
dv
dM
= 0.
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(iv) Price of basic product, pB = F
q
K
2F (K F ) :
dpB
dF
= K
2
4(K F )2
q
2(K F )
FK
> 0.
dpB
dK
=   F 2
4(K F )2
q
2(K F )
FK
< 0.
dpB
d
=   KF
42(K F )
q
2(K F )
FK
< 0.
dpB
dM
= 0.
(v) Price of premium product, pR = K
q
K
2F (K F ) :
dpR
dF
= (2F  K) K2
4F 2(K F )2
q
2F(K F )
K
> 0 (given K < 2F ).
dpR
dK
= (2K   3F ) K2
4F (K F )2
q
2F (K F )
K
< (>)0 for K < (>)3
2
F .
dpR
d
=   K2
42F (K F )
q
2F (K F )
K
< 0.
dpR
dM
= 0.
(vi) Demand for a basic product, xB =
q
2 F
K
(K   F ):
dxB
dF
= (K   2F )
q

2KF (K F ) < 0.
dxB
dK
= F
K
q
F
2K(K F ) > 0.
dxB
d
=
q
F (K F )
2K
> 0.
dxB
dM
= 0:
(vii) Demand for a premium product, xR =
q
2K
F
(K   F ):
dxR
dF
=  K
F
q
K
2F (K F ) < 0.
dxR
dK
= (2K   F )
q

2FK(K F ) > 0.
dxR
d
=
q
K(K F )
2F
> 0.
dxR
dM
= 0:
(viii) Total share of basic products, SB = 4t(K F )+K
(K F )
1q
K
2F (K F )M
  F
(K F ) :
dSB
dF
= 1
2F (K F )GM

K2
(K F )   4t (2F  K)

  K
(K F )2 where G =
q
K
2F (K F ) .
If

K2
(K F )   4t (2F  K)

< 0 then dS
B
dF
< 0. If

K2
(K F )   4t (2F  K)

>
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0, then from (12) the expression has an upper bound where 1
GM
= K
(4t(K F )+K) :
dSB
dF
  K(K(2F K)+4t(4F K)(K F ))
2F (K F )2(4t(K F )+K) < 0 (given K < 2F ). Thus
dSB
dF
< 0.
dSB
dK
= F
(K F )2 +
F
2K(K F )2
1
MG
(4t (K   F ) K) where G =
q
K
2F (K F ) . If
(4t (K   F ) K) > 0 then dSB
dK
> 0. If (4t (K   F ) K) < 0, then
from (12) the expression has a lower bound where 1
GM
= K
(4t(K F )+K) :
dSB
dK
 F (K+12t(K F ))
2(K F )2(K+4t(K F )) > 0. Thus
dSB
dK
> 0.
dSB
d
= F
KM
q
K
2FK 2F 2

(K + 12t (K   F )) > 0.
dSB
dM
=   1
(K F )M2
1q
K
2FK 2F2
(K + 4t (K   F )) < 0.
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